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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This an appeal from a decision of the Third Dictrict Court 
against the Defendant-Appellant on Plaintiff-Respondent's Declara-
tory Judgment Action seeking to rescind a apartment Dweller's 
Insurance Policy based on material misrepresentations provided in 
the preparation of the application. The Court dismissed the 
Appellant's counterclaim. 
DIPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At a non-jury trial in Third District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Judge James S. Sawaya granted a Declaratory Judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff-Respondent and against Defendant-Appellant, 
thereby voiding an insurance policy issued to the appellant on 
the ground of material misrepresentations in the application for 
said policy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Lower Court's decision, 
ordering the lower court to rule that the Plaintiff-Respondent 
did not meet the burden of proof as a matter of law, or, in the 
alternative, granting a new trial to have the proper standard 
applied in determining "material misrepresentation"• 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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FACTS 
On October 6, 197;, The appellant applied for Insurance with 
the Respondent Company by providing information to Lloyd D. 
Ferguson, an agent for the Respondent, (Exhibit P-1). The 
coverage was to cover Appellant's property at an apartment 
located at 938 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah. In the 
process of filling the application, several mistakes were made 
either through oversight of one or both the agent and the 
appellant or through deliberate omissions. 
The agent admits to mistakes in writing the effective date of 
the policy and duration (T-53), the length of anticipated vacancy 
each year (T-57), the coverage for additional living expenses (T· 
58), and on the appellant's name (T-72). 
The crucial issues, however, were in conflict. The 
Respondent sought to prove that the Appellant had intentionally 
withheld information required regarding prior insurance history 
and prior losses, (Exhibit 1, lines 8A and 8B), 
On October 2, 1975, the Appelant had been covered by a binder 
of homeowner's policy with Aetna Insurance Company by their 
Agent, Ed D. Smith and Sons Insurance (T-28, Exhibit P-5) and a 
second binder for a "valuable items policy" was prepared on the 
Appellant's behalf on October 7, 1975, (T-32, Exhibit P-5). On 
October 9, 1975, the appellant filed a claim for a loss due to a 
burglary at the covered premises in an amount of approxiamtely 
$8,600.0 (T-17, Exhibit P-5) and was paid a compromised amount. 
- 2 -
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(Exhibit P-5 , T-157). On about October 17, 1975, Aetna can-
celled his policy in a rather vague fashion. (Exhibit P-5). The 
adjuster for Aetna didn't know why, at the time of Depositions in 
this case (T-144) and Linda Messerly, the only Aetna witness who 
testified at the trial didn't know the basis for the cancellation 
(T-35, 36, 43, Exhibit 5). Bill Zimmerman seems to indiate that 
the Respondent Company, for which he is a Regional Associate 
Underwriter, considers cancellation for non-payment of premium is 
an "underwriting reason", but not to refuse insurance. 
(T-132-133). The alleged misrepresentation here had to give 
rise to a probable rejection of the Apellant's application 
only if the Aetna Policy was cancelled for an underwriting 
reason. (Exhibits P-1, P-6, T-83, 84, T-133). The Appellant had 
never paid a premium to Aetna. (T-167, T-33, Exhibit P-5). 
Linda Messerly and Exhibit P-5 both indicate that all 
correspondence was mailed to the Appellant at 422 South Twelth 
East, Apartment 19, in Salt Lake City, Utah, (T-32,33, Exhibit P-
S). The Appellant testified that he lived at that address, 
Apartment 9 (T-149, T-163) and the deposition of Oslowski indi-
cated the loss took place at Apartment 9 of that address. 
(T-146, Exhibit P-5). 
The appellant only received one item, the binder from Aetna, 
mailed to the wrong address. (T-163 to 166). Aetna correctly 
addressed the releases and the checks for his claim. (Exhibit 
- 3 -
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P-5, T-163). Therefore the record would indicate no notice of 
cancellation was effectively mailed to the Appellant. He stated 
his first written notice of cancellation was when he was pre-
paring for a deposition with the Respondent. (T-164). Even then 
the only cancellation information was for the policy itself and 
not the valuable items rider, which was unexplained at court. 
(T-39, 145, 193, 194). 
The Appellant maintained at trial he had informed the agent 
for Respondent of the dimensions of the prior loss (T-177, 181, 
T 183-189, 193-196,16) and the mixed nature of this cancellation. 
The only information he would have had was an oral notice, not 
binding at all, from Oslowski, Aetnas Adjuster. (T-167, 168, 13, 
14,). The Prudential Agent denied receiving information on the 
loss or the Aetna history. (T55-62). 
After the Respondent bound coverage for the Appellant on his 
premises, the Appellant suffered a loss as a result of a fire on 
the premises. One or two days after the fire, October 20, 1976, 
Appellant sought recovery under the terms of his policy. The 
Respondent sought this action for a Declaratory Judgment Rescindin: 
the Insurance Contract with Prudential based on alleged misrepre· 
sentations provided on the application by the Appellant regarding 
his history with Aetna. The trial court found for the Respondent 
and the Appellant appeals. 
The Appellant is an Iranian Citizen who has English language 
difficulties (T-17, 169-170. 
- 4 -
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I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE COURT 
COULD INFER THAT THERE WAS ANY INTENTIONAL OR WILLFUL 
MISREPRESENTATION MADE ON THE APPLICATION TO PRUDENTIAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OR THAT ANY MISREPRESENTATION WAS MATERIAL 
TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE RISK OR TO THE HAZARD ASSUMED. 
Section 31-19-8 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) states 
as follows: 
1. All statements and descriptions in any application 
for an insurance policy or annuity contract, or for 
the reinstatement or renewal thereof, by or in 
behalf of the insured or annuitant, shall be deemed 
to be representations and not warranties. 
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts, 
and incorrect statements shall not prevent a reco-
very under the policy or contract unless: 
a. fraudulent; or 
b. material either to the acceptance of the risk, 
or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or 
c. the insurer in good faith either would not 
have issued the policy or contract, or would 
not have issued reinstated or renewed it 
as the same premium rate, or would not have 
issued, reinstated or renewed a policy or 
contract in as large an amount, or would not 
have provided coverage with respect to the 
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true 
facts had been made known to the insurer as 
required either by the appli~ation for the 
policy or contract or otherwise. 
While the language does not specify that the misrepre-
sentation, omission or concealing of facts must be willful, with 
the intent to deceive, the contract of insurance does. 
Furthermore, case law in Utah construing that Section of the 
statute also requires an willful act done with the intent to 
deceive. 
In Wootton v. Combined Insurance Company of America 395 P.2d 
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724 (1964) at Page 725, the Court said: 
Unless the misrepresentations in the 
negotiation for an insurance policy are 
made with the intent to deceive and 
"materially affect either the acceptance 
of the risk or the hazard assumed by the 
insurer" The insurance contract cannot 
be avoided by an insurance company. Mere 
falsity of answers to questions propounded 
are insufficient if not knowingly made 
with the intent to deceive and defraud. 
Likewise, are the cases of Marks v. Continental Casualty co., 
427 P.2d 387 (Utah 1967) and Burnham v. Banker's Life and Casualty 
470 P.2d 261 (Utah, ). 
The Appellant here testified at trial that not only did he 
not make any misrepresentations willfully, he made none at all. 
Even if the court concluded he made misrepresentations, there was 
not sufficient evidence before it to infer an intent to 
deceive. The Apppellant stated he gave the agent for Respondent 
all the information he had available including having had prior 
insurance and a burglary. The burglary was listed on Exhibit 5, 
the application. Respondent's witness, Bill Zinnnerman, testified 
the agent was deficient in not listing the items lost by the 
prior burglary on the new application. (T-135, 136). There was 
no reason not to conclude that other information was likewise 
omitted through agent error. 
More importantly, however, is the point that the Appellant 
could only provide information regarding his prior coverage to 
- 6 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the extent that he was aware of it. If he was not informed of 
the cancellation of the Aetna Policy, then no inference may be drawn 
that he intended to keep the information from Prudential. 
Again, the Appellant testified he had nothing more than a 
vague rumor from Martin Oslowski, an adjuster for Aetna, that his 
policy was cancelled. He didn't receive actual notice tmtil pre-
paring for the claim which resulted in this action, after he had 
signed the application for the coverage at issue here. 
The District Court erred in assuming he had notice of the 
cancellation. The purported oral statement was from a man who 
did not have the power to cancel insurance with Aetna or did he 
know the reason the insurance had been cancelled. For example, 
was the insurance cancelled for non-payment of premium? (Tl44, 
145, 198, 199). Linda Messerly, the person who sold the Aetna 
policy also gave no testimony regarding the reason for the can-
cellation. Apparently while not discussed, the court accepted 
the dubious evidence of mailing of the cancellation notice. No 
witness could testify that the notice was, in fact, placed in a 
mailbox. But even if we assume that, the notice was clearly sent 
to the wrong address. The notice of cancellation, as the copy in 
Exhibit 5 shows it was sent to 422 South Twelth East, apartment 
19. The Appellant testified that there is only 12 apartments at 
422 south Twelth East and that he lived in apartment 9. In the 
case of Walker Bank and Trust Company v. First Security 
Corporation, 341 P.2d 944 (Utah, 1959) at Page 945, 
- 7 -
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the court stated: 
"There is, of course, no presumption that a 
letter, even though mailed in regular course 
was received by her when it was not addressed 
where she was living." 
In that case the notice of cancellation of an insurance 
polciy was mailed to a person in Texas when she lived in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. But the rule is the same if it's next door or 
across the Country. Here the unrebuttable testimony was that the 
appellant did not recieve notice of cancellation from Aetna or 
its' agents and there is no competent evidence to the contrary. 
Consequently, the Appellant was not shown to have made any 
misrepresentations to the agent of Respondent, if there was a 
misrepresentation made at all. Furthermore, if there is no 
showing the appellant had not burden to prove lack of that there 
was a misrepresentation, the Appellant had no burden to prove lack,: 
intent. But, again, he testified that he had no such intent. A 
burden foisted upon him through the utilization of assumptions 
not supported by evidence or law. 
There was insufficient evidence of intent to decieve or 
defraud. There was no showing that the appellant knew that a 
prior burglary would affect his insurability for a future loss 
from a fire. The previously cited cases all deal with issues 
surrounding health or life insurance policies. The questions all 
involved representations or misrepresentations regarding the 
health of the insured. There was no competent evidence at our 
trial to indicate that the appellant would not have been insured 
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if the true facts had been known, only that no binder would have 
been issued. An inquiry form could have been submitted to 
Prudential for their consideration. (T-100). 
Bill Zimmerman testified that the only event proved at trial, 
i.e. a loss in excess of $8,000.00, would not have prevented the 
Agent from binding the insurance (T-118). He said if connected 
with a prior cancellation, there could be no binding power in the 
agent. (T-118, 122). We have shown there was no evidence pre-
sented at trial to show the Appellant had knowlege of a 
cancellation. 
Both Bill Zirrnnerman and Lloyd Ferguson stated that if non-
payment of a premium was the reason for the cancellation, Mr. 
Ferguson could have bound coverage, as he did, for the Appellant. 
The record is devoid of the basis for the cancellation. 
Consequently there was no showing that a misrepresentation, if 
any, was: 
a. material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to 
the hazard assumed by the insurer; or 
b. the insurer in good faith either would not have 
issued the policy, or contract, or would not have 
issued reinstated or renewed it at the same premium 
rate, ;r would not have issued, reinstated, or re-
newed a policy or contract in as large an amount, 
or would not have provided coverage with respect to 
the hazard resulting in the loss, if the true facts 
have been made known to the insurer as required 
either by the application for the policy or contract 
or otherwise. 
31-19-8 (l)(b),(c) 
Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
- 9 -
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This case should be reversed and remanded to the District 
Court with instruction to enter judgment in favor of the 
Appellant. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO APPLY AN INDUSTRY STANDARD IN 
DETERMINING THE MATERIALITY OF ANY MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
Appellant sought and the Respondent proffered evidence on the 
Industry Standard- on the issue of materiality. In other words is 
-
the requirement of "Materiality" to be determined from the particu: 
Insurance Company's good faith interpretations or on a broader, 
more objective standard. The District Court chose the more 
narrow standard. (T-107, 108, 119, 120, 141, 142, 147). 
In Burnham v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company 470 P.2d 261 
(Utah) this court spelled out the standard by which the 
materiality of a misstatement is to be measured. 
They said: 
First, unless the misrepresentations 
in the negotiation for an insurance polciy 
are made with intent to deceive and 
materially affect either the acceptance 
of the risk or the hazard assumed by 
the insurer, the insurance contract 
cannot be avoided by an insurance 
company. Mere falsity of answers to 
questions propounded are insufficient 
if not knowingly made with intent 
to deceive and defraud. Second, whether 
or not a misstatement in an application 
is material to the risk, while it is 
- 10 -
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for the jury t? determine, depends not 
upon what the insurer or the insured 
~ay think about materiality or the 
importance of the false information 
given or the true information withheld 
but upon what those engaged in the ' 
insurance busines, acting reasonably 
and naturally in accordance with the 
usual practice among insurance companies 
under such circumstances, would have done 
had they known the truth: that is, whether 
reasonably careful and intelligent men 
would have regarded the facts stated as sub-
stantially increasing the chances of the 
happening of the event insured against so 
as to cause a rejection of the application. 
id. at P. 263 
The only evidence tendered on this point was the testimony of 
Bill Zimmerman, a Regional office of the Respondent Company. He 
testified he had worked for two prior insurance companies and had 
been an underwriter at a company level for nine and a half years 
(T-113-115). He was with one company only a few months. The 
rest of his knowledge of Industry Standards came by rather infor-
mal means. e.g. an occasisional review of a competitior's policy 
(T-121), discussion at conventions (T-129), and gossip in 
general. (T-130) 
Those qualifications certainly did not give adequate foun-
dation to qualify Mr. Zimmerman as an expert witness on the 
Industry Standard as to what representations are material. Three 
insurance companies do not adquately represent the Myriad of 
Insurance companies doing business in Utah. 
- 11 -
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Even According to the Respondent's position in this matter 
l 
that is, where the terms forbidding misrepresentation are a pan 
of the application or policy, the company's rules prevail, the 
issue of materiality is not covered. Because of the flexibilicy 
needed, what is material and what isn't becomes subjective to a 
large degree. The decision will almost always arise after a loss, 
The issuing Company has a bias that may be reflected in the 
determination of whether a past representation is material or 
not. To save an immediate payment, they are likely to stretch 
the issue of materiality as far as is necessary. Where they have 
controlled the terms of the contract up to the point, there 
should be a more objective way of protecting an insured who has 
made misrepresentations, willfully or not. The grounds upon whid 
a misrepresentation may be used to void a policy may be set, con-
sistent with Utah Law, by the issuing company. But a more 
objective standard is necessary to determine whether a statement 
is material. Only then can the purchasing public be assured of 
fair treatment over issues that cannot be bargained or shopped 
for. The issue of material misrepresentations will only arise 
when the claim is sought to be paid. 
The case should be reversed and remanded with instructions to 
either judgment for the Appellant or, in th alternative, ordering 
a new trial to be consistent with the law in Utah. 
- 12 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
The lower court failed to apply the proper standard in deter-
mining the materiality of any misrepresentations on the applica-
tion for insurance. Had the court applied the proper rule of 
law, the Respondent did not present sufficient evidence on the 
Industry Standard to show that any misrepresentation was 
material. 
If any event, the evidence was insufficient to show an inten-
tional misrepresentation and the court erred in assuming the 
Appellant was sufficiently informed to make a material misrepre-
sentation on the issue of past insurance coverage. 
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